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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
NOVEMBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-060.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 27, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) The U.S. delegation conducted a detailed discussion of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Topics covered by the paragraphs discussed included reporting on the location of bombers absent from their air base during inspections, the uses of site diagrams and coastlines and waters diagrams, the benefits and drawbacks of inspecting two silos of launchers during Type 1 inspections, and whether one or more fixed structures might be inspected at a base for mobile ICBMs. End Summary.

[1](#)4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A Daunting Challenge; Exhibition of Heavy Bombers; Hypothetical Inspection Scenario; Detailed Discussion of Section VI; and Wrap Up.

A DAUNTING CHALLENGE

[1](#)5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting and commented that

reports from Washington, D.C., indicate a firm commitment to finish the treaty within the next several days and that a target had been set to get all of the work done by Friday, December 4. He emphasized that this would be a "daunting challenge." Warner proposed that the group re-examine Article XI and the shortened paragraph related to exhibitions; issues which the Parties had taken as homework from previous sessions. Warner offered a consolidated paper with a revised joint draft text of Article XI and a U.S.-proposed paragraph on exhibitions. Col Ilin commented that the Russian side had reviewed Article XI texts and agreed to review the latest U.S. effort.

EXHIBITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS

16. (S) Ilin commented that discussion of exhibitions was important especially for heavy bombers and he wanted to move this topic forward to discuss distinguishing features on heavy bombers and how the different types of inspections pertain to heavy bombers. He also provided a document in Russian which addressed which paragraphs from Article XI could be moved into the Protocol. Warner agreed to review it and be prepared to discuss it during the next meeting. Warner stated that heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments did not belong in a Type 1 inspection, whereas B-1B heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would be subject to the Type 1 inspection until they were converted. Once all B-1Bs were converted, there could be periodic exhibitions to demonstrate that the bombers had not been reconverted to

carry nuclear armaments. Ilin asked whether these exhibitions would be non-mandatory and Warner replied that there had to be some obligation to make such heavy bombers available for exhibition. He suggested an Agreed Statement could capture the specific verification activity along with the periodicity, but there would at least be an agreement in principle to demonstrate that converted heavy bombers had not been re-converted. Warner proposed to take a further look at procedures to demonstrate that the nuclear weapons will not be on the converted heavy bombers, that the bombers will be incapable of carrying nuclear weapons, and that there were not nuclear warheads stored on the base.

17. (S) Warner handed over a Russian version of the Article XI paragraph for exhibitions. Warner proposed that the more detailed descriptions for exhibitions should be placed in the Protocol to which Ilin agreed. Ilin pointed out that the initial U.S. proposals for heavy bomber exhibitions called for identification of distinguishing features. Warner responded that the U.S. side recognized that the distinguishability exhibition could easily be combined with the exhibition following the conversion of the first heavy bomber. He also pointed out that there is a potential that the United States might wish to convert other heavy bombers in the future and discussed a three step procedure: the first step was a description of the conversion process as had been discussed in the Conversion or Elimination Working Group; the second was an exhibition of the conversion of the first bomber; and third was the routine exhibitions to confirm the conversion of all the remainder of the heavy bombers undergoing conversion. Warner stated there could be a fourth step, which would be a measure to demonstrate that the converted heavy bombers had not been re-converted. Ilin stated that Russia viewed this last step as a function of a Type 2 inspection. Warner disagreed and proposed an exhibition rather than a Type 2 inspection since there may be many conversions which could exhaust the Type 2 inspection quota.

HYPOTHETICAL INSPECTION SCENARIO

18. (S) Ilin described a scenario for an inspection of an air

base. If an inspection team arrived to inspect the heavy bombers, the situation would provide for three possible types of activity. In the first type, the inspection team agrees with the declaration and counts zero deployed nuclear armaments. In the second type, the inspection team agrees there are no nuclear armaments on the heavy bombers, but could agree to count one weapon for the bomber whether nuclear or non-nuclear. In the third type of activity, the inspection team assures the arms are non-nuclear and the result would be zero. Ilin asked which of these three options would be preferred by the United States. Warner responded that there were two steps involved in each of the three options presented: 1) what type of information would be briefed to the inspection team; and 2) what type of inspection activity would be performed by the inspection team.

¶9. (S) Warner commented that the U.S. approach accounted for nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers as well as any objects not declared to be nuclear armaments. He pointed out

that radiation detection equipment could be used to confirm a sampling of objects loaded on heavy bombers that were declared not to be nuclear armaments. Petrov asked what would the inspectors do if they encountered a shrouded item which could not be visually verified as being other than a nuclear armament. Warner responded that the inspectors could use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the shrouded item was non-nuclear. Warner commented that the U.S. side disagreed with the use of virtual numbers of armaments and that the inspectors should use the actual numbers of warheads in the weapons storage area.

DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SECTION VI

¶10. (S) Warner began by stating that paragraph 1 of Section VI was based on the combined inspection and thought the sides had agreed on the type of information to be declared for ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases to which Ilin agreed.

¶11. (S) Warner noted that one key difference on heavy bomber requirements was the Russian requirement to specify an exact location for absent heavy bombers beyond national territory, while the U.S. side proposes to provide only a general location for those heavy bombers deployed overseas. As discussion continued, Warner questioned Ilin whether he was ready to have no treaty at all over the issue of precise vs. general locations of heavy bombers since the U.S.-proposed text is the same as the practice implemented under START and the Parties have been operating this way for 15 years.

¶12. (S) Turning to paragraph 9/7, there was discussion about the distinction between uses of site diagrams and coastlines and waters diagrams for inspections. Petrov commented that for each type of facility, Russia provides a site diagram; a general site diagram for facilities with silos and a specific site diagram for submarine bases. Warner pointed out that the United States uses site diagrams only for ICBM and heavy bomber facilities. For submarine bases, a site diagram is used for the data update-type inspection and a coastlines and waters diagram for the nuclear warhead portion of the inspection. Specific revisions of text were discussed including the reason for the U.S. bracketed listing calling for two deployed ICBMs or SLBMs vice one to be inspected during a warhead inspection. Warner stated that two ICBMs or SLBMs were to be inspected to broaden the sample and provide a more reliable basis on which to confirm that the inspected side is in compliance with its obligation regarding deployed warheads. He further stated the Russian side had frequently expressed concern about U.S. upload potential and the United States thought that a larger sample with each inspection would address the Russian concern. The United States believed that a larger sample provided greater confidence; the tradeoff is that it takes more time. To minimize the impact on the facility, the text provides that the second silo or launcher must be located in the same launch group or

on the same SSBN as the first selected silo/launcher. To the discussion of perceived Russian concerns over uploading, Ilin responded that he thought the United States and Russia had moved to a condition of greater transparency where we had less concern that the other side would upload. Warner stated that both sides had their own concerns and neither of us

completely trusts the other. Regarding warhead inspection of two missiles, Ilin questioned whether the second missile should be subject to the full cycle of the inspection procedures. Warner responded "yes" since the Parties are counting exact numbers of warheads; there is a need to follow the full procedures to determine the exact number of reentry vehicles on both missiles. Both sides agreed that inspecting two missiles would require substantially greater time.

WRAP-UP

¶13. (S) Warner and Ilin agreed to stop at this point in the review of Section VI, but Warner thought the IPWG would need to work every day to accomplish the work. He proposed that on Saturday both sides will have worked on analyzing each other's draft of Article XI and can agree. Article XI should be completed so it can be sent to the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTWG) and he asked the Russian side's help to convince both Parties in the TTDWG that the ideas in Article XI developed by the IPWG are valid.

¶14. (U) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.:

-- Joint Draft Text of Article XI and Proposed Text for Exhibitions, dated 27 November 2009.

- Russia:

-- Draft of Article XI dated November 27, 2009.

¶15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Maj Johnson
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Col Petrov
Ms. Vodopolova
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS